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Abst ract
Thesubject ofempathy has been increasing in popularity and importance; correspondingly, the
theoretical aspects qfempathy are in need qff urther development. This paper outlines key concepts
and processes related to empathy, particularly the mechanisms qf identification and regression as
they are discussed in the models qf empathy articulated by Fleiss, Greenson, and Jordan.
Si milaritiesand differences ofthe models areexamined, in addition toeach model's description ofthe
roles qf identification and regression. Although each model has made significant contributions
towards a theoretical perspective qf empathy, none ofthem have distinguished pathologicalfrom
non-pathological uses qf identification. A lso, none qf the models qfftred descriptions of the
pathological ornon-pathological uses ofregression in empathy. In response to these differences, a new
model ofempathy is proposed. This new model emphasizes the non-pathological roles ofidentifica-
tion and regression, which make empathy a creativeprocess involving a therapist's highly developed
ego and egofun ctions.
The subject of em pa thy has been incr easin g in popularity and import an ce with
the development of psychotherapy th eories such as se lf-psycho logy ( I) a nd self-in-
relation (2). However, th e conce pt of em pa thy was initially seen in th e professional
lit eratu re a t th e turn of th e ce n tury , wh en Titchner translat ed Eirfii hlung as to "feel"
or "fi nd" one 's way int o a no the r 's experience (Ba bine a u, R. The Empathet ic Mode in
Psych otherap y. Roch est er, 1993) . Sigm und Freud (5) also recogni zed th e im port a nce
of em pa thy in psychotherap y. H e sta te d th at. .. ."A path lead s fro m ident ifica t ion by
way of im itat ion to em pa thy, th at is, to th e com pre he ns ion of th e mech an ism by
mea ns of whi ch we a rc enabled to tak e up a ny a t t itude at a ll towards another men tal
life" ( 1912, p. 11 0). However , m uch of th e lit erature on em pa t hy is scatt ered diffu sely
throu gh out a vast number of works. G reen son (4) com ments tha t a na lyst s often
eithe r take empathy for grant ed or underestimate it. He not ed so me a ntagonism
between em pa thy a nd th eory, as th eor eticians neglect th e a rea of e m pa thy whil e
em pa thic clinician s write little th eory.
There remain many qu estions, a reas of disagreement , a nd burgeoni ng idea s
rela ted to the con cept of em pa thy. In this paper, I will a tte m pt to help th e reader
underst and key conce p ts and processes relat ed to em pa thy, particul arly th e mecha-
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nisms of identification a nd regression as t hey a re d iscu ssed in three recognized
model s of e m pat hy . These model s include those of Fle iss (5) , Greenson (4), a nd
J ordan (6). Aft er a review a nd cr it iq ue of t hese m od els, I will in t rod uce my own model
of e m pa t hy a nd exp lai n the non- pa thological ro les of id en t ifica t ion and regression
included in this m od el.
CONCEPTUA L DEVELOPMENT OF MODELS O F EMPAT HY
Theorists have co nce p tualize d e m pa t hy in many ways throughout this cen tu ry.
F reud (7) sa w it as the or ig in of comic pleasure a nd a lso as centra l to the process of
psychoanal ysi s. Flei ss des cribed e m pat hy as putting onese lf in to a nother's pla ce , or to
"s te p into his [another's] shoes" ( 1942, p. 2 12) . W inni cot t (8) associated e m pa t hy
with the infa nt 's early holding envi ronmen t crea te d by the mother " fee ling" th e
in fant 's need s. This e nviro nment must be reli able , p rot ect t he infan t from excessive
annihilation fears, a nd involve ph ysical holding. Greenson (4), on e of the first ego
psycho logists to wri t e in the second half of thi s ce n t u ry about the ce n t ral ro le of
e m pa t hy in psych o the rapy, thou gh t of e m pa t hy as emot iona l knowing or the expe r i-
e nc ing of a not he r' s feelings. Hi s se m inal pape r "Em pat hy and its V icissitudes "
( 1960) se rve d as a focal po in t in the his to ry of empathy lit e ra t u re because he gave
insight in to the the rapis t 's expe rie nce of the empat hic process. Greenson provided a
detail ed di scu ssion of identification wit h his patient , while he out lined t he "workin g
m od el " of the patient a nd the se q ue nce of eve n ts invo lved in the e m pa t h ic process
(9).
Empathy a lso se rve d as the ce n t ral focu s in se lf-psyc ho logical t heory introduced
by H einz Kohut. In hi s 1959 paper, " In tros pect ion, Em pat hy , a nd Psychoa nalysis,"
Kohut described e m pat hy as "vicarious int ro spection " and d escr ibed it as an essen-
ti al co ns t it ue n t of a ll psych ological observat io ns . H e sta te d that empathy defined the
field of depth psychology, a nd unlike Fre ud, beli eved that th e class ic tools of fr ee
associa t ion a nd a nalysis of resist ances we re o nly aux ilia ry instruments used in t he
service of int ro spection a nd e m pat hy (I).
Other theorists suc h as Wol f, Basch a nd Nade lso n have fu r ther deve lop ed
Kohut's id eas a bo u t e m pat hy . W olf ( 10) su m marized Kohu t 's thou gh ts regarding
e m pat hy as: a) se rv ing to de fine the fie ld of dep th psycho logy, b) a processing
fun ct ion to ob ta in inform ation durin g the process of psych othe ra py, and c) a
se lf-s us tain ing fun ction to help the person feel bett er by mini m all y shari ng his /her
feelings. Basch , ( I I) fu r t her describ ed the process of vicarious in trospection as: a)
recognizing the therapist 's affect ive response to the pa ti e n t , b) decentering his /her
a ffec t ive reaction, and c) id enti fyin g the patient 's a ffec t ive sta te foll owing t h is
int erch ange .
Nade lso n has re m embered Kohu t 's view of empat hy as " a fundam ental mod e of
human relat edness .. . the recognit ion of the se lf in the o ther .. . t he accepting,
co n fir m ing and underst anding human ec ho ... t he resonance of essen tial hu m a n
al ikeness" ( 12) .
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A number of o the r co n te mporary t heoris ts have art iculated their own persp ec-
tives abo u t the nature of em pa thy . H a milton ( 13) sta te d th a t empathy serves to hold
a nd co ntain the therapeutic relation ship by allowing th e therapist to underst and th e
pa ti ent, a nd a lso se rves a n interpretive fun cti on . J ordan (6) d escr ibed em pa thy as
having both a ffec t ive a nd cog nit ive as pects expressed as a co mplex intellectual a nd
e mo t ional process. Fin all y, Rogers ( 14) wro te abo u t th e ro le of empathy in th e
psych otherapeu ti c rel ation ship, not ing th ose relationships based on empathic under-
stand ing correlate d with successful the rapeut ic outcome. In Rogers ' syst em, th e most
helpful the rapist p rocedure involved the the ra pist clarifying and ope nly sta t ing
fee lings which th e cl ie nt had been approaching hesitan t ly. In an e m pa thic th erapeu -
tic re lat io ns hip, Rogers described th e th erapist as: a) genuine and transparent , b)
acce pti ng a nd prizin g of th e uniq uen ess of th e ot her pe rson, and c) sensitively see ing
the patient a nd his/her world as the patient does.
Rogers proposes that if th ese above charac te ris tics a re present , th e client will
expe r ie nce positive the rapeutic change. H e sta tes that em pa th ic un d ersta nding is
present wh en th e th erapist is se ns ing the feelings a nd person al mean ings whi ch th e
client is expe rie nc ing in each m oment , wh en he ca n perce ive th ese from "insid e as
t hey see m to the client " ( 14) .
FLEISS' MODEL OF EMPAT HY
Flei ss (5) label ed em pathy a tri al identification a nd described its process as
involvin g four di st inct parts . First , th e a nalys t is th e object of th e patient's striving.
Next, he /she ident ifies with the pat ient, a nd becom es th e patient. After experiencing
the patient 's st riving, the anal yst proj ect s it back onto t he patien t with insid e
knowled ge of it s na ture. From this process, th e analyst has acq u ired the emot iona l
basis for hi s/her interpret ation.
Prior to Flei ss ' description of em pat hy, ot her th eorist s had concep tual ized
e m pathy as involving a n osc illa t ion between two pe rs pect ives . Fre ud said that th e
th erapist must maintain a "sus pe nde d eve n-hove r ing a tten tion" to the therapeutic
process (7). This sus pe ns io n was to occ u r between the persp ectives of observation and
introsp ection. The idea of em pat hy occ ur r ing as a n osc illat ion between two pe r-
sp ectives is a co rne rs tone for la te r models. Flei ss includes this osc illat ion as he
describes movemen t from the anal yst 's persp ective to that of th e pat ien t , and then
ba ck aga in to the a nalys t. In his model , he uses the pro ces s of ident ifica tion as well as
the process of proj ecting back insid e kn owled ge of the patien t 's experience. Whi le
Flei ss does not furth er d efine his use of identification , it appears to serve a defensive
function relat ed to incorporation of exte rnal objects by eat ing or swa llowing (5) .
Flei ss does not com me n t on a ny use of regression in his mo de l of empathy. By
orga nizing id eas abo u t identification and th at of osc illation into one model of
em pathy, Fleiss ' co n t ribu t ion has hist orical sign ifica nce whi ch is reflected in lat er
mod els of em pa thy.
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Green son (4) a r t icu la tes a no ther mo de l of empathy tha t is very expe rie n tia l in
nature. H e sta tes th at th e th erapist feels initiall y "out of it" in th e th erapeutic
situa tion, but gradually a llows him /herself to become th e patient. The therapist th en
list en s through th e " working model " of th e patient by list ening to th e patient 's
word s, a nd then transforming th em into pictures a nd feel ings from th e patient 's
m emories. The th erapist uses his/her own ex periences similar to th e patient to mak e
em ot ional co n tact a nd expe r ie nces a fee ling of "aha." Finall y th e th erapist de ter-
mines how best to com m unica te this underst anding to th e pat ien t.
Greenson's conce pt of th e " wor king mod el " is cr it ica l in his de scrip tion of
e m pa thy, as it provid es a len s through whi ch he ca n connect wit h th e patient and
acc u ra te ly underst and. T o build this working mod el , he begins with every thing kn own
of th e patient , including expe r ie nces, behaviors, m emories, fan tasi es, dreams, de-
fen ses, a nd resi stances. As resist ance is diminish ed , th e th erapist 's th eoreti cal
knowled ge, clinical experien ce , a nd view of th e patient 's pot en ti al s are added .
Fin all y, the th erapist adds his /her expe r iences with sim ila r people an d si tuations (4) .
Green son 's mod el of em pathy is based on his ow n se lf-observa t ion whi ch he ha s
painst akingly d escribed . H e a llows th e read er to expe r ie nce with him in detail his
process of con nec t ion with th e patient. In addition , Green son osc illa tes from obs erver
to participant, and back to obs erver as he " fee ls out of it, " list en s, mak es emotional
co n tact , th en underst ands.
Green son states iden tifi cation is di fferent fro m em pathy, ye t sti ll clos e ly-r el a ted.
While identification is " unconsc ious a nd permanent ," em pat hy is " preconsc ious and
temporary" (4). According to Greenson , identification se rves a tim e-lim it ed defen-
sive function in that he temporarily " becomes th e patient " during th e em pathic
process. H e makes no co m me nt on an y use of regression in his mod el of empathy.
JORDAN'S MODEL OF EMPATHY
Jordan (6) a r t icula te s a more con te m po ra ry m od el of e mpathy. She says th e
process sta r ts with a m otivation towards rel at edness with ano the r and invo lves a
su r re nde r of on e 's a ffec t ive a ro usal in resp onse to the othe r. Ne x t, th ere is a
temporary identification with the other. Simultaneou sly, one kn ows th e source of
affect is in th e other. After temporary identification with th e o the r, th e affect
subsides into an increased feeling of se pa ra te ne ss. From this process, one has the
ability to help th e other underst and his/her world bett er.
Jordan (6 ) sta tes that while temporary identification is occ urri ng , the person
expe r ie nc ing it is also aware th at th e source of affec t is in th e o the r. Thus, J orda n
concept ua lizes em pa t hy as having cogn it ive and affective part s. This duali stic na ture
of e m pa t hy allows an affective connect ion (id entification) to occur sim ultaneously
with a cogn it ive se pa ra te ness (so urce of affect as in th e o the r) (6). Sim ila rly , other
a u thors have discussed the process of em pathy as bein g both det ach ed and involved
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(4). jordan, however, disagrees with th e use of regression in empathy in other part s of
he r writ ing . Further sc ru t iny of her writings and personal communication (1994 )
sho w that she understands regression to be represent ed by wri te rs and clinicians
primarily as a defensive and pathological process.
SUMMARY OF MOD ELS
Before exam ining th e sim ila r it ies a nd differen ces among the three main models
of em pathy a nd offering a critique of t hese mode ls, I will bri efly summarize th e key
co ncepts add ressed by Flei ss, Green son , a nd j ordan in th eir representative models.
Fleiss (5) int roduced th e process of identification in em pathy ("trial identifica-
ti on " ) via " becom ing" the patient. Afte r gaining understanding of t he patient , the
anal yst proj ect s thi s underst anding ba ck to th e pa ti en t. Fle iss uses the oscillat ion
between ob server-particip ant-ob server in his descript ion .
Green son 's (4) mod el pres ents in d et ail th e th erapist 's ex pe rie nce of empathy.
Hi s description of th e working mod el is a ce n t ra l part of this ex pe r ience . As he
oscillat es from obse rve r to participant to obse rve r, he speaks of his react ions to th e
patient progressively. An "aha" is reache d, a nd he co m m unica tes th is understanding
to the patient.
j ordan (6) d escribes a n in it ial "su rre nde r of affective arousal," lead ing to a
" te m porary identification. " Through affect ive co nnectio n wi th and cognitive separat e-
ness fro m the ot he r, one ca n help th e o the r underst a nd his/her wo rld better.
SIMILARITIES, DIFFERENCES, AND CRITIQUE OF MODELS
Green son and Fleiss d escribe th e th erapist "becoming an other" which takes an
a lmos t lit eral view of th e tradition al and defen sive definiti on of iden tification .
However, Greenson a lso views identi fication as se rv ing a non-defe ns ive fun ction wh en
he describes it as " te m po rary a nd preco nscious. " H e is detai led and non-t rad it iona l
in his description of th e th erapi st 's ex pe r ie nce of empathy. j orda n a lso denot es
identification as "tempo rary" and as serving a non-defens ive function. jordan,
Green son , a nd Fleiss a ll follow th e co nce p t of osc illat ion fro m obs e rve r to participant
to observe r. Also, a ll ascribe an important ro le to the conce pt of ident ification in
e m pathy. While G ree nso n & Flei ss do not co m me n t on the us e of regression in
em pathy, j ordan clearly di sagrees wit h it s use in pathological term s. All of t hese
models contribute important ideas to a model for em pathy, ye t they fa il to fu lly
add ress the non pathological rol es of identification a nd regression in the empathic
process. These d eficien cies sugges t a reas for fu tu re th eory developm ent a nd clarifica-
ti on .
A NEW ~IODEL OF EMPAT HY
After reviewing the empa thy lite rature a nd th ree mam mode ls of e m pa thy, I
sugges t a new mod el of em pa thy which involves th e non-pa th ologica l process es of
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regression and identification as cru cia l parts of th e em pa thic pr ocess. I propose the
following model of empathy:
I. Following a desire for connection, one regresses in orde r to be influenced
affectively by another person's affect.
2. Id entification with that person occurs affe ctively, whil e rem aining cog nitivcly
separate. This occurs in a fluid a nd oscillating manner.
3. The regression rev erses so th at one becomes affec t ively se parate.
4. One us es what is learned in th e identification pr ocess to share with the other
person on e's understanding of his /her world.
This model shares similarities with that ofJordan's a nd utilizes the histor ical
conce pt of observer-participant-observer oscillation . My mod el introdu ces the use
of regression in a non-pathological manner, a llowing one to understa nd better th e
transition between obs erver and participant.
IDENTIFICATION AND EMPATHY
In addit ion to it s defen sive fun cti on , the pr ocess of iden tifica tion plays an
important rol e in learning a nd em pa thy through out th e normal life cycle. As a child,
on e consta n t ly expe riences th e loss of a loved object or of a significa n t ly grat ifying
relationship with th e object , usually a parent. As th e child develop s, he / sh e loses
typ es of gra t ifica t ion whi ch were a ppro pria te to th e pr eviou s phase of maturation.
The child tries to ret ain th e lost grat ifica t ion by identifyin g wit h aspects or qualities
of th e person who was once th e source of th ese gra t ifica tions. These int ern a lized
aspects of th e other person are th en re-established as part of th e develop ing ego.
Freud in fact described th e ego as composed of th e internaliz ation s from abandoned
obj ect-cathexis (16) .
Melanie Klein sta te d that identification plays a fundame ntal ro le in deve lop-
m ent throughout th e course of one 's life . Highly ca thecte d peopl e, such as lovers and
spouses, associat ed with love and not loss, may be th e focus of identification and
strengthening of th e ego. Wishes and unfulfill ed fantasies of on e 's child hood re la ted
to un consciou s mental processes a re a part of normal men tal fun cti oning th ro ugh out
one's life ( 16).
An examina t ion of Piaget 's learning th eory of ass imila t ion a nd accommodation
may also be us ed to further understand identifica tion. Assimilation invo lves the
incorporation of external reality by a self, producingjudgem ent in th e se lf. Accommo-
dation , on th e ot he r hand, involv es testing what is learned fro m ass imila t ion, or the
se lf relating to ex te rnal reality. Identification ca n be seen as part of assimilat ion, as
th e person in question tak es in part of th e ex te rnal reality a nd becomes like it (17) .
Piaget has di sagreed with eq ua t ing assimilation a nd identificat ion , say ing that
assimila t ion is more than identification. Assimilation produces new structures only in
conj unc t ion with accommodation, making th eir interdependen ce essen tial. Furthe r-
more, th e underst anding of relationships and th eir reciprocit y, as ga the red from the
ass imila t ion-accom modat ion process, is th e co rne rs to ne of learning. This complex
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and dynamic in te rch a nge ca n not be repres ented simply by the co nce p t of id entifica-
tion. The processes of ass imilation a nd id entification, however, do share some
similarit ies. Both can be us efu l in understanding th e process of em pathy. By taking in
information from another, both affectively and cognit ive ly, one ca n lea rn about th e
other a nd test this lea rning through interpretation of the o ther's experience.
REGRESSIO N AND EMPATHY
Simi lar to identification, th e m echanism of regression plays an im portan t rol e in
the process of em pat hy and has both pathological a nd non-p athologica l significance.
Regression has been defined as returning to an earl ie r ph ase of d evelop m en t to avoid
the anxiet ies in th e cu r re n t ph ase (18). This d efinition conce pt ualizes regression in a
defensive or pathologi cal manner. Defensively, regr ession helps a person to emotion-
a lly stabilize in the presen ce of seve re conflic ts related to the wish es of earlier phases.
Through regression, the wish es may be give n up and th e individu al may return to
wishes of earl ie r phas es (16) .
However, regression is al so a normal part of m ature adult life a nd serves a
nondefen sive funct ion. Fr eud initially linked the processes of drea m s, jokes, and
e rrors of eve ryday life to temporary fa ilures of regres sion . An other author has sta ted
that these a re not failures but rather normal psychi c ph enomena a llowing pleasur-
abl e expression of wishes whi ch have been defended agains t since chi ld hood. Regres-
sion in the service of the ego, as term ed by Kris, a llows for th e enjoyment of activiti es
suc h as in te llect ual and artistic cre a t ivity, enjoym en t of works of ar t and en te r ta in-
ment , rel igious ac tivitie s, spor ts, recreational ga mes, sexual int ercourse , re laxation ,
and sleep ( 18,19,20) . Regression in these case s is reversibl e , co nt ro lled and must be
regulated . The ability to con t rol regression in suc h ac t ivit ies is du e to strength in the
ego a nd is regu lated through volun tary and temporary wit hd rawa l of cathexis fr om
one of m any a reas . When regression goes too far suc h as in crea tivity, symbols
become unintelli gible . If con t ro l is dominant , the crea te d results are cold and
uninspired . Those un able to expe r ie nce suc h pl easurabl e ac t ivities rel a ted to cre at iv-
ity a re threaten ed by the proces s of lett ing them selves go, which d ema nds a sense of
sec u r ity (20) .
Thus, regression is a process that ca n be used bo th defensively and non-
defensively. One ca n im agin e a con ti nuu m ex isti ng bet ween normal a nd pathological
uses of regression. When us ed non-pathologicall y, regression ca n enhance normal
ad u lt life and the em pa thic underst anding of ano the r.
SPECULAT IONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER DEVELOP MENT
Afte r revi ewing the non-pathologi cal a nd pathological functions of identificat ion
and regression , I will now propose specula tio ns co nce rn ing the use of these m echa-
nism s in the e m pa thic process. Thes e a re areas for furt her deve lopment th at may
ex pand th e lite ra tu re a nd th eory of em pat hy.
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As dis cussed in my model, em pa thy is not so lely based on identification , but
rather is influen ced a lso by regression . When used in th e empathic process, regres-
sion of th e th erapist a llows him /her to identify with th e patien t 's phase-appropriat e
expe rie nce s and d ifficu lt ies (Solky, C. Person al comm unica t ion, 1994) as th e th era-
pist is influ en ced by his/her own child hood expe riences . As we have seen in our
di scussions of ident ifica t ion a nd regression, child hood expe riences and difficult ies
great ly influen ce fun cti oning as adults a nd a re thus cogen t a reas for un derstanding
in psychodynamic psychotherapy. I ag ree th at regression a llows for phas e-appropri-
a te identi fication wit h th e patient , an d propose th at regression a llows th e th erapist to
use his/her person al a nd profession al expe rie nce to access ph ase-appropria te expe ri-
ences pr oducti vely for th e patien t. If regression were to not occur in em pa thy,
identification involved would draw from a more nar row perspect ive of th e th erapist
a nd would lim it his/her basis of underst anding. The th erapi st 's con t rolled regression
allows him /her to cre a te another persp ecti ve of th e pa tient whe n used with th e
identification process.
In my model I a lso propose that regression coupled with identi fication lets one
use th e learning process to aid development in a no the r person. Ident ifica t ion used
alone may develop a person as he/ sh e tak es in exte rnal information and begins to
cha nge him/hersel f. The add it ion of controlled regress ion in empathy allows on e to
view th e phase-appropri at e persp ect ive of ano ther, learn as the other models his/her
persp ecti ve a nd experience, a nd th en sha re this learned persp ecti ve with th e patient
wh en th e regression is reversed. As th e th erapist shares his / her perspective of the
pat ient , th e patient learns and develops.
Fin ally, my mod el of em pa t hy focu ses on a n interacti ve process where on e takes
from a not he r and th en gives back in a modified for m after util izing his /her
expe rience and skills. New meanings of expe riences are cre ated by the two peop le
involved as th ey learn , making em pa thy a n ar t ist ic ac t ivity . Thus, regression in the
service of th e ego repl enish es and nourish es th e child hood wis hes a nd wounds of the
othe r, con t r ibu t ing to th e healing pr ocess possible in psychothera py and all relation-
ships.
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